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The fallout from the global economic downturn of 2008-09 is a continuing source of stress on families and 
a constraint on government policies.  Due in part to effective, but expensive, automatic stabilisers and 
discretionary fiscal stimulus, growth in economic output has now resumed in most OECD countries and 
has further accelerated in major emerging economies.  Much uncertainty remains, however, and the 
recovery so far has been partial and highly uneven.  Labour markets in most countries remain slack, 
household wealth has been eroded and commodity prices are volatile.  These factors can inhibit families’ 
attempts to contain the damaging effects of economic woes on their current and future well-being.   
Well-functioning social protection is especially important during times like these.  Maintaining and 
strengthening income transfers and employment-oriented measures in the immediate aftermath of the crisis 
has helped to smooth family incomes and supported aggregate demand and employment.  As economies 
emerge from recession, active social policies remain highly relevant: they can help deliver a sustained, job-
rich and equitable recovery.   
But social-protection systems are under pressure.  The economic crisis and slow recovery have added 
further urgency to meeting the demographic and structural challenges facing welfare states.  Furthermore, 
the majority of governments are embarking on fiscal consolidation.  Social expenditures, which account for 
about half of total public spending in OECD countries, cannot be exempted from savings efforts.  But this 
is difficult in the context of elevated need for government support and there will be consequences for 
poverty and inequality.   
How can social policies contribute to a quick and equitable recovery from the crisis and how can they best 
respond to the difficulties that households continue to face?  What role can and should social policy 
budgets play in improving the budget outlook of countries facing unsustainable government debt?  And 
how should governments prioritise different areas of social spending when faced with heightened demand 
for support but, often, much reduced fiscal space?  This paper addresses these questions in light of 
countries’ experiences during the most recent and earlier economic downturns.   
The first part sets out the current fiscal context for social policy making.  The second part considers the 
distributional consequences of economic downturns and discusses the equity implications of different 
social policy responses, notably of tax and transfer policies.  The third part highlights the role of 
employment growth for tackling both fiscal challenges and concerns over rising inequality.  The fourth part 
analyses countries’ recent and announced policy initiatives and compares current trends in social 
expenditure with the patterns seen over previous business cycles. A final part concludes by discussing 
policy priorities for helping households, and government budgets, recover. 
                                                      
1 .  An earlier version of this paper has served as background paper for discussions at a meeting of OECD 
Social Policy Ministers in May 2011.  The discussion draws on the most current data and projections at the 
time of writing.  The paper has been prepared by Herwig Immervoll who, at the time of writing was senior 
economist at the OECD Social Policy Division and is currently senior economist at the World Bank, and 
by Ana Llena-Nozal, economist at the OECD Social Policy Division.  We are indebted to numerous 
colleagues at the OECD for very helpful comments on earlier drafts.  The usual disclaimer applies.  In 
particular, the views expressed do not represent the official positions of the OECD or the governments of 
its member countries.  
  11.  Reduced fiscal space 
OECD countries have emerged from the economic downturn with different budgetary challenges and fiscal 
outlooks, but the majority of them face substantial fiscal challenges (Figure 1).  The total deficit in OECD 
countries is expected to exceed 6% of GDP in 2011, with France, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Poland, Spain, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, having the largest shortfalls.
2  Some countries with high 
deficits face less intense market pressure than others to close budget gaps, and the shortfalls expected for 
2011 are a significant improvement over 2010.  But the levels of borrowing are still historically very high.  
Total gross government debt in 2011 in the OECD as a whole will reach 100% of GDP.  In Greece, Italy 
and Iceland, debt levels are significantly higher, while Japan’s government debt is expected to exceed 
200% of GDP.  At the other end of the spectrum, deficits are likely to be 3% or less of GDP in around a 
third of countries.  Debt-to-GDP ratios below 60% are also projected for around a third of countries.   
Figure 1.  Government debt and balances 
Forecast for 2011, per cent of GDP 
 
Note: Financial balances include one-off factors and are on a national accounts basis. Both deficits and debt levels may differ from 
the numbers reported to the European Commission for some EU countries. Data for Norway are for mainland Norway only, excluding 
net revenues from petroleum activities. 
Source: OECD (2010), Economic Outlook, No. 88. See www.oecd.org/eco/sources-and-methods. 
Compared with OECD economies, the public finances of major emerging economies are in better shape.  
Growth in output and government revenues continued during 2007-09, although public expenditure 
increased more rapidly than revenues.  In emerging G20 economies, budget deficits were held under 4% of 
GDP in 2010, half the level in the OECD for that year.  In some emerging economies, such as India, 
deficits are much bigger, but are not unsustainable as long as economic growth remains high. 
                                                      
2 .  These projections were based on policy announcements up to November 2010.  They do not include, for 
instance, the December 2010 agreement in the United States to extend tax cuts. 
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The need for and urgency of short-term fiscal consolidation therefore varies.  Importantly, however, the 
greater part of current deficits is believed to be “structural” rather than “cyclical” in a number of OECD 
countries.
3  This means that governments in these countries will still be spending more than they receive in 
revenues when the recovery is well entrenched.  To address structural challenges, all countries need to seek 
ways to maximise the value for money that their social protection systems provide.   
1.1.  The wider costs of unemployment 
Unemployment is costly – for the individuals concerned and for the economy as a whole.  The immediate 
budgetary loss due to higher benefits and reduced revenues (from income taxes and social security 
contributions) can be in the order of 80% of GDP per head for a lost full-time job.  Figure 2 illustrates 
these costs for low-to-average earners entitled to unemployment benefits.  The immediate fiscal effects of 
job loss can be smaller for some groups, such as those with very low earnings (and so a small direct-tax 
burden) or those entitled to little or no benefits.  However, costs can also be higher for people who leave 
jobs for early-retirement, sickness or disability benefits (which are sometimes more generous than 
unemployment benefits).  For the family situations considered in Figure 2, the costs of joblessness are the 
same or larger on the revenue rather than the expenditure side of the public finances in a number of 
countries, mainly in Continental Europe.  The fiscal or budget crisis is therefore not just a spending crisis. 
Figure 2.  Unemployment is expensive: direct fiscal cost of job loss, 2009 
Job loser entitled to unemployment benefits, per cent of GDP per head 
 
Note: Model calculations averaging across different family types (singles and couples with and without children) and earnings levels 
(for each family type: 67 and 100 percent of the average wage before becoming unemployed).  The amounts shown are calculated as 
the sum of benefit entitlements in the initial phase of unemployment and the direct taxes and social contributions payable in the lost 
job.  Benefit entitlements are based on the assumption of full eligibility of unemployment benefits, and full take up of means-tested 
benefits where these as available.  Social contributions include the employees’ and employers’ part, as well as any payroll taxes.  
Knock-on effects on other types of benefits or tax revenues (e.g., lower indirect taxes due to reduced consumption) are not taken into 
account. 
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by 
the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the 
terms of international law. 
Source: OECD tax-benefit models (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives). 
                                                      
3 .  The November 2010 edition of the OECD Economic Outlook expected cyclically adjusted (or “structural”) 
deficits to account for more than three quarters of 2012 deficits in the OECD on average.  The main drivers 
of this result were much lower revenue expectations, the remaining costs of fiscal stimulus measures, 
reduced GDP growth, and increased debt-service burdens. 
  3Recessions cause a slump in a range of important revenue sources (in some cases, corporate revenues have 
fallen by almost a fifth for example), and are often followed by periods of sluggish revenue growth.  
Figure 3 looks at the aggregate picture, confirming that reduced government revenues have often had a 
greater impact on the budget balance than higher benefit expenditures.
4  For instance, if 2010 revenues in 
Spain had been the same in real terms as in 2007, this would have reduced the budget deficit by more than 
6 percentage points.  Returning to 2007 benefit expenditure levels would have reduced the deficit as well, 
but by much less (3 percentage points). 
In contrast, in about half of countries, higher public spending on transfers was a more important driver of 
deteriorating public finances than the decline of all sources of revenue combined.  This was, for instance, 
the case in the United States, and in a range of countries (such as Austria, Belgium, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic) where government revenues increased between 2007 and 2010. 
Figure 3.  Budget deficits: changes in public transfers and government revenues 
Expenditure and revenue changes 2007-10, real terms, per cent of 2010 GDP 
 
Notes: The vertical axis is inversed (a positive number indicates an increase in social benefit expenditure and, hence, a deteriorating 
budget balance).  Government transfers refer to all cash social benefits paid by government (SSPG series in the OECD Economic 
Outlook Database).  Government revenues refer to total tax and non-tax receipts of the general government sector (central and sub-
central, plus social security contributions).  Values for 2010 are estimates and are therefore preliminary. 
Source: Calculations based on OECD (2010), Economic Outlook, No. 88. 
This analysis has important implications for social policy and fiscal consolidation strategies.  Reversing the 
recent growth in social protection spending would be a big step towards mitigating fiscal problems.  And, 
realistically, necessary social policy reforms in many countries will indeed need to find ways to “do more 
with less”.  But reducing social spending is not sufficient to restore health to the public finances.  For 
                                                      
4 .  Figure 3 shows cash transfers only as detailed data on services spending over the recession are not yet 
available. Nevertheless, cyclical changes in services spending (especially health, the largest component) 
tend to be small, delayed and short-lived.  Cash transfers should therefore capture most of the variability of 
total social expenditures in a downturn. 
  4   
example, in a majority of countries, a return to 2007 levels of transfer spending would have closed less 
than a third of the budget gap in 2010.  Moreover, no OECD country has been able to achieve cuts of this 
scale in the context of weak growth and elevated unemployment.  In several countries, the size of current 
budget deficits makes it clear that determined measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side 
would be required to return to fiscal sustainability.  Everywhere, employment and earnings growth is 
essential both for reducing benefit spending, and for shoring up government revenues now and in the 
longer term. 
2.  Social policy and inequality: the crisis as a “stress test” for families 
Can budget deficits be addressed while minimising the adverse impact on inequality and poverty?  And 
which types of redistribution measures should receive priority when rebalancing expenditures? 
Widening income inequalities and, in many cases, increasing poverty rates, were evident before the crisis 
and are receiving increasing policy attention.  While the issue is still debated, inequality has also been 
argued to be among the contributors to the imbalances that led to the financial crisis.  Past experience has 
shown that it is very difficult to cut social expenditures without increasing inequality.  Significant short-
term savings require reductions in benefits, and benefit receipt is naturally concentrated among low-
income families. 
2.1.  Income losses and gains during downturn and recovery: how are they shared? 
Studies prepared for a recent OECD conference have documented that recessions trigger large losses for 
some of the poorest income groups.
5  This is of particular concern as the recent recession follows a well-
documented medium-term trend toward a more unequal income distribution and, often, increasing rates of 
income poverty.  While the full evidence on the most recent income changes has yet to emerge, data on 
income gains and losses in earlier economic cycles provide some valuable pointers for policy.  Figure 4 
shows trends in market incomes (i.e., before adding benefits and deducting taxes) in order to illustrate the 
demand for government support at different stages of the economic cycle.  Income trends are shown for 
eight selected OECD countries and at three points in the national income distribution (“low”, “median” and 
“high” levels of market income).
6 
In the United States, market incomes in the low-income group fell until the mid-1990s despite an increase 
in labour-force participation.  Real incomes subsequently grew strongly until 2000 but then fell back so 
that at the end of the period, they were the same as they had been in the late 1970s.  In the seven other 
countries shown, and before accounting for taxes and benefits, real incomes in the “low” group are now 
lower than they were at the beginning of available data series.  One reason is that employment gains were 
to some extent concentrated in households who already had some earnings, while the number of workless 
households increased in some cases.  A growing number of households with no earnings at all can result in 
a very steep fall of market incomes at the low end of the distribution (e.g., in Australia, Finland and United 
Kingdom following the recessions of the mid-1990s, and in Israel and Poland later on).  Government 
transfers are essential for cushioning some of the steep losses suffered by these households, and for 
preventing them from falling into deep poverty. 
In contrast, incomes in the upper part of the distribution have often continued to rise during downturns, 
albeit at a reduced pace (Canada, Denmark and the United States, for example).  Where downturns do 
                                                      
5  .  Immervoll, H., A. Peichl and K. Tatsiramos (eds.), 2011, Who Loses in the Economic Downturn? 
Economic crisis  Employment and Income Distribution, Research in Labor Economics, vol. 32, Emerald, 
6 .  This grouping provides one particular perspective on income changes during past economic cycles.  Part 3 
below looks at the recent labour-market experiences by gender, age and educational attainment. 
  5result in longer-lasting losses for higher-income groups (as in Australia, Finland, Poland), the relative 
income decline tends to be significantly smaller than for low-income earners.  The main exception to this 
pattern is the 2001-02 recession in Israel: income losses among higher earners persisted, while earnings at 
the bottom recovered (albeit from a level that was much lower than in the 1990s). 
In some recoveries, the lowest incomes grew more quickly than they did at the top (Canada from 1993, 
Denmark during the 1990s).  But this usually followed a period of sharply declining incomes for low 
earners.  As a result, episodes of narrowing income differentials have rarely lasted long enough to close the 
gap between high and low incomes that had opened up previously.  In other countries, market-income gaps 
stagnated or continued to widen even as low incomes recovered from deep or prolonged labour-market 
downturns (see Finland and the United Kingdom).  The data points are spaced several years apart and 
therefore do not capture the full income dynamics over the cycle.  It appears, however, that any disruptions 
in the upwards trends for high-income groups during the downturns of the early 1980s and 1990s were 
short-lived.  Importantly, the incomes of the very highest earners (such as the top 1%) are not included in 
the “high” income series in Figure 4.  For this group, very large gains were recorded prior to the downturn 
in some countries (see Box 1). 
Box 1. Income trends at the very top 
It is a well known phenomenon that survey data – such as those underlying Figure 4 – under-sample the very 
highest incomes.  However, top incomes are highly relevant to the effectiveness and scope of redistribution policies. 
Researchers studying income-distribution trends in the United States reported that “it is the top 5% of households 
that have gained [since the late 1970s], and the bottom 60% that have lost, in relative shares.”
1  Data drawn from tax 
statistics indicate that during the 2002-2007 boom period, the highest-earning 1% of all families in the United States 
(those earning in excess of around USD 360 000) accounted for as much as two-thirds of total market-income growth.  
During the past two to three decades, the increase in “top” income shares were especially pronounced in mainly 
English-speaking countries (as well as in China and India), but less so in continental Europe.
2 
Recent recessions have resulted in lower “top” income shares, but the drops tended to be short-lived (especially 
when compared to the Great Depression period).  New data for the United States suggest that during the most recent 
recession, falling “top” income shares were initially mainly a result of much-reduced realised capital gains, while other 
income sources of “top” earners were much less affected.  Similar data covering most of the twentieth century for a 
wider set of countries indicate that banking crises have reduced income shares at the very top, but not for other “high” 
earners.  Economic booms tended to push up the shares of “top” earners (top 1%) at the expense of other “high” 
earners (top 90-99%).
3 
1.   Lindert, P. H., 2000. "Three centuries of inequality in Britain and America," in: A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (eds.), 
Handbook of Income Distribution, chapter 3, pages 167-216, Elsevier. 
2.   See OECD, 2011. Causes of Growing Inequality in the OECD Area, forthcoming, and Atkinson, A. B., T. Piketty and E. Saez, 
2011. “Top Incomes over a Century or More”, Journal of Economic Literature, forthcoming. 
3.   Roine, J., J. Vlachos and D. Waldenström, 2009. “The long-run determinants of inequality: What can we learn from top income 
data?”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 93, pp. 974–988. 
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Figure 4.  Market-income gaps grow during downturns – but often do not close during booms 
Household market incomes, constant prices (earliest data point=100), households headed by working-age individuals. 
 
Notes: “Low” and “high” incomes refer to the 10th (UK: 15th) and 90th percentiles of the distribution of household market incomes. 
“Low” growth periods are the bottom-third growth years during 1979-2005 in each country. Start of series varies due to data 
availability. Separate series indicate a change in underlying data sources. “Market” income includes private transfers. Initial income 
gaps between “low” and “high” incomes differ between countries. Comparisons of these gaps should therefore be made over time, not 
across countries. 
Source: Immervoll, H. and L. Richardson (2011), “Redistribution Policy and Inequality Reduction in OECD Countries: What Has 
Changed in Two Decades?”, Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 122, www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers. 
  72.2.  Implications for redistribution policies 
These historical patterns are informative for designing policies today, when most OECD countries are 
emerging from a deep recession with their public finances under severe strain.  The data underline the 
importance of well-targeted government transfers during economic slumps, as well as during the recovery.  
But redistribution strategies based on government transfers alone would be neither effective nor financially 
sustainable.  In restoring incomes at the bottom, a key challenge for social and labour-market policy is to 
facilitate employment and earnings growth that benefits low-income groups in particular.  This requires not 
only new jobs, but jobs that enable people to avoid and escape poverty.  Recent trends towards higher rates 
of in-work poverty indicate that job quality has become a concern for a growing number of workers.  The 
current labour-market slack, and a resulting unfavourable bargaining position of marginal workers in 
particular, adds urgency to policy reforms that tackle inequalities in the labour market, such as those 
between standard and non-standard forms of employment. 
The relative stability of higher incomes – and their longer-term trends – are also important to bear in mind 
in planning fiscal consolidation measures.  A number of countries with large revenue needs (such as 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, United Kingdom) have recently raised tax burdens for higher earners, involving 
both increased income-tax rates and a broader tax base.  Realistically, and as illustrated by the broad set of 
other tax measures taken in these countries, much more additional revenue is needed than what can be 
collected from income taxes only and, specifically, from high incomes alone.  Concerns about economic 
efficiency and the implications for economic growth must also be borne in mind, especially when 
increasing tax rates (rather than broadening the base).  However, the historical income trends do signal a 
significant shift in the relative “tax capacity” of lower and higher-earning groups in the aftermath of steep 
downturns. 
It may therefore be necessary to critically review whether existing tax provisions should be adapted in light 
of equity considerations and current revenue requirements, in particular where those with high or very high 
incomes have benefited from declining overall tax burdens in the past (e.g., because of non-compliance, 
because tax expenditures mainly benefit high-income groups, or because of lower property and wealth 
taxes).  In these cases, progressive tax increases, e.g., by improving compliance and broadening tax bases, 
can indeed be a better way of raising additional revenues for fiscal consolidation.  Reforms in this direction 
also help to offset some of the growing gap between high and low incomes. 
Costs and benefits of targeting 
In practice, fiscal consolidation is likely to be achieved through a mix of revenue and spending measures.  
And in each case, appropriate targeting can limit adverse distributional consequences.  On the tax side, 
replacing expensive and badly targeted indirect-tax concessions (for food, clothing etc.) with direct support 
for low-income households would yield sizeable fiscal gains and reduce inequality. Progressive measures, 
such as raising ceilings on social security contributions or reducing tax avoidance or evasion among 
higher-income groups, would also generate revenues while strengthening redistribution. 
On the benefit side as well, targeted measures can help to make fiscal consolidation measures more 
equitable.  Further means-testing can reduce benefit expenditures while protecting the most vulnerable.  At 
the same time, benefit cuts are likely to contribute to higher inequality, if transfers are already highly 
targeted.  Means testing also imposes economic costs.  Work disincentives associated with targeting on 
family income are likely to become more damaging once labour demand starts to pick up during a 
recovery.  In addition, means-tested programmes often suffer from low benefit take-up, resulting in poor 
coverage among the targeted population and less success in reaching vulnerable groups. 
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Targeting on behaviour or non-income characteristics is an alternative that can produce cost savings, while 
leaving incentives intact.  One example is the use of broad indicators of deprivation, which many countries 
apply in order to determine eligibility for social housing.  These can be a good basis for effective targeting, 
especially for services and in-kind transfers, without reducing incentives to find employment.  Some forms 
of conditional cash transfers, such as those pioneered in Mexico and Brazil, can in fact create positive 
externalities by promoting beneficial health or educational outcomes.  The concept of “mutual obligations” 
also makes benefits conditional on claimant behaviour and aims to restore self-sufficiency and prevent 
long-term benefit dependency.  Again, these are examples of positive externalities created by targeting.  As 
more job vacancies are posted during a recovery, there is indeed a stronger case for linking benefit receipt 
more tightly to job-search or availability-for-work requirements.  In the context of fiscal consolidation, an 
important consideration is the need for adequate administrative and operational resources to enable an 
effective implementation of “mutual obligations” and other targeting measures. 
2.3.  Social policy as an investment in the future 
Beyond immediate redistribution, the timing and targeting of fiscal consolidation has longer-term 
consequences, although these are difficult to quantify and often disputed.  For some areas of social 
spending, there is, however, strong evidence of distinct long-term benefits or costs which should inform 
decisions on how to share savings efforts between different parts of social-protection budgets.   
Previous recessions have shown, for instance, that programmes leading to early withdrawal from the labour 
market (early retirement or quasi-retirement payments, disability benefits) create large and practically 
irreversible increases in social expenditure.  While often politically difficult, tightening the availability and 
generosity of these payments is an effective way of reducing social expenditures now and contributing to 
safeguarding future fiscal sustainability in the face of ageing populations and workforces.  Without 
effective gate-keeping, there is a high risk that expiring entitlements to unemployment benefits trigger 
significantly greater inflow into so-called “inactive” benefits. 
Other policies have a social investment character with short-term cost but provide potentially attractive 
future payoffs.  These include active labour market policies that prevent unemployment from turning into 
long-term benefit dependency, especially among the young, and programmes that help reconcile work and 
family life (the effectiveness of these policies is discussed in Part 3).  Measures that safeguard child well-
being, especially during the formative years of early childhood, are also a priority area.  While 
contemporaneous poverty is of concern in itself, the adverse long-term consequences of child poverty are 
well documented.  These “scarring” effects of low-income spells mean that when the recession ends, its 
impacts on children do not.  The provision of adequate, uninterrupted and active support for the least well-
off is therefore a central and critical element of social protection, especially at a time of elevated poverty 
risks. 
Publicly provided services or goods can be an integral part of carefully balanced support for vulnerable 
groups, such as children, job-seekers, individuals with health problems or groups facing extreme economic 
hardship (e.g., the homeless).  As recently argued by the National Inequality Panel in the United Kingdom, 
the provision of public services can be an effective way of making access to important aspects of life less 
dependent on income.  As a result, service cuts can be a particular concern when a large number of people 
cannot afford market-based services.  They may also hinder an effective policy response to severe labour-
market problems.  For instance, cuts to education budgets can exacerbate the future problems arising from 
the very steep increase in youth unemployment (see next section).  Likewise, budget cuts can reduce the 
capacity for implementing new or existing redistribution and labour-market programmes.  Savings 
measures instituted at different levels of government can result in considerable additional co-ordination 
challenges, notably in federal countries like the United States, with devolved responsibilities for these 
programmes.  
  9Furthermore, while scaling back service infrastructure produces short-term savings, these may not translate 
into longer-term efficiency gains if significant human or institutional capital is lost in the process.  There 
can therefore be trade-offs between quick cost-cutting fixes (such as budget ceilings or envelopes), and 
measures to improve longer-term efficiency.  These trade-offs are likely to be important in the case of 
services which will see increasing demand in the future (e.g., childcare, long-term care).  When responding 
to cyclical fiscal pressures, one relevant consideration is that service cuts are typically not easily reversed, 
so that temporary reductions in service capacity can create greater future costs than temporary changes to 
cash transfers or taxes. 
There are good reasons for prioritising some areas of social expenditure over others.  Yet all major 
spending items must be reviewed to yield short-term savings, including politically sensitive areas such as 
old-age pensions.  While reforms to retirement-income systems quite rightly focus on long-term financial 
sustainability, short-term changes might help to spread the burden of fiscal adjustment more equally across 
income and age groups.  In principle, this approach would be best suited to countries where public 
pensions are relatively high (and so retirees were not significantly affected by the financial crisis).  There 
are, however, often legal and political hurdles to changing the accrued rights of pensioners, and so savings 
typically have come from delaying or suspending benefit increases.  Poverty rates among older people 
have fallen in most countries over the past two decades, while poverty among young adults and children 
has become more widespread.  Nevertheless, old-age poverty remains a challenge in many countries, and 
so cost-saving measures should be targeted so as to protect low-income pensioners.  Fiscal gains might also 
be reaped by limiting special tax treatment of retirees or retirement incomes, which typically benefit better-
off pensioners in the main.  Part 4 of this paper highlights some of the recent reforms that OECD countries 
have introduced. 
3.  A job-rich recovery 
Both the current fiscal situation and inequality trends discussed in the previous sections underline the need 
for economic growth to be accompanied by strong employment creation: a “job-rich” recovery. 
3.1.  Patterns of problems in the labour market 
The recent economic downturn had a global reach.  Output fell in most OECD countries almost 
simultaneously, while growth in emerging economies slowed significantly.  But the depth of the recession 
within the OECD varied significantly.  Contractions were small in Australia and Poland.  In contrast, real 
GDP fell by 10% in Finland and Japan and by substantially more in Estonia, Iceland and Ireland 
(Figure 5).  There were also significant differences between countries with similar drops in GDP.  Some 
countries – such as Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden – were remarkably successful in 
limiting initial employment and earnings losses despite large falls in economic output.  In others, such as 
Spain and the United States, the jobs crisis has been deeper and more persistent than expected. 
Although the impact of higher unemployment has been felt throughout the economy, some groups are 
much more likely to face difficulties in the labour market.  Historically, downturns have tended to hit 
already disadvantaged groups, such as youth, low-skilled and temporary workers, disproportionately.   
Figure 6 (panel A) shows that this has also been the case in the most recent downturn.  The graph also 
highlights that employment rates have continued to decline after the third quarter of 2009, when GDP was 
already recovering in most OECD countries.  The very large increase in youth unemployment is a 
particular concern as those failing to gain a foothold in the labour market are known to suffer low 
productivity and a range of social problems not only now, but also later in life. 
Some patterns of labour-market problems differ from earlier recessions, however.  In part, this is because 
the structure of labour markets was different this time compared with earlier cyclical downturns.  The share 
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of employees in temporary jobs, for example, increased by about a fifth in the decade to 2007 in the EU15 
states.  At the start of the crisis, non-permanent jobs accounted for one in five workers in Poland and 
Portugal and nearly one in three in Spain.  Temporary work has also become substantially more significant 
in Japan and Korea.  During a downturn, temporary workers are much more likely to lose their job than 
those on a permanent contract.  As a result, their greater numbers may contribute to large and rapid 
increases in total unemployment. 
Employment rates of older workers, on the other hand, have tended to increase both in the recession and in 
the recovery that followed.  In view of the demographic challenges facing OECD countries, this is clearly a 
positive development and in stark contrast with previous experience, when older workers were more likely 
to lose their jobs than people of prime age.  One reason for this change is that pension reforms in many 
countries have restricted access to early retirement in public pension schemes and made it financially less 
attractive.  A few countries, including Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland, have also introduced 
comprehensive disability-benefit reforms.  Another explanation is that this downturn coincided with a 
financial crisis, unlike the recessions of the early 1980s or early 1990s.  In countries where private 
pensions are a significant source of retirement income, losses in private pension assets may have 
encouraged people to postpone their retirement, if possible. 
Figure 5.  The financial crisis led to a jobs crisis, but some labour markets were remarkably resilient 
Changes in GDP and total hours worked during the recession, in percent 
 
Notes: Changes are assessed from GDP peak to through in each country.  For Israel, Switzerland and Turkey, changes refer to 
employment levels as comparable data on total hours are not available. 
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics and Main Economic Indicators. 
  11Figure 6.   Employment trends for different population groups 
Panel A. Change in employment-to-population ratios 
unweighted average across 31 OECD countries, in percent 
 
Panel B. Share of individuals living in workless households 
working-age population (15-64), in percent 
 
Note: Households are defined as “workless” if all household members are either unemployed or labour-market inactive. 
Sources: OECD Employment Database and OECD estimates based on the European Union Labour Force Survey and the United 
States Current Population Survey. 
Female employment has generally suffered much less than that of men in the recent crisis.  Again, this is a 
notable deviation from historical patterns which is largely due to output losses in sectors with a 
predominantly male workforce, such as manufacturing and construction. But cuts in public-sector 
employment announced or already implemented in several countries are likely to change this balance, since 
female employment is concentrated in the public sector in many countries. 
Yet, an individual perspective on labour-market experiences gives only an incomplete picture of families’ 
difficulties.  Panel B of Figure 6 shows that the proportion of people living in households without any 
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income from work has gone up almost everywhere, and has increased by some 50 percent in Estonia, 
Ireland and Spain.  In debates on fiscal consolidation and other policy reforms, these households deserve 
special attention as they are particularly vulnerable and highly dependent on government support.  With 
more than one in eight working-age persons now living in workless households in most countries, the 
success of redistribution measures and active social policies depends to a large extent on whether outcomes 
can be improved for this specific group. 
3.2. Active  social  policies 
Households try to adapt to an economic shock, such as a major loss of income, in order to minimise the 
effects on their living standards.  A range of adjustment mechanisms exist, including a change of spending 
patterns, borrowing or drawing down savings and relying on family support (see Box 2).  A primary 
response is to seek alternative earnings opportunities.  For many households, this may not be successful in 
the depths of recession, although evidence shows that a large number of new jobs are created even then.  
But prospects improve as economic recovery begins to take hold.  
Box 2. Household resilience and family support 
Families share resources during all phases of the economic cycle, but family-based support is of particular 
significance when economies are weak.  The flip side of greater economic security for family members affected by 
unemployment or financial losses is a greater demand on the resources of other family members or friends whose own 
jobs and personal savings are safe.  Widespread unemployment or troubled pension investments can be expected to 
lead to greater demand for intergenerational support.  There is, for example, recent evidence of large numbers of 
unemployed youth in the United States returning to the parental home, or not moving out in the first place.  Those 
depending entirely on family support even before the recession, notably children, are particularly likely to suffer as a 
result of widespread income losses, and to benefit from a speedy recovery. 
Despite the importance of “vertical” support between generations, “horizontal” support – between spouses or 
cohabiting partners, for example – plays a bigger role in stabilising household incomes.  Women’s existing earnings 
have a straightforward income-stabilising effect for families.  As discussed in the main text below, the sustained growth 
of women’s labour-force participation over the past decades has boosted many families’ abilities to cushion losses.   
At the same time, however, households are getting smaller, with growing numbers of single-person and lone-
parent families and fewer multigenerational households.  Single-adult households obviously face a complete loss of 
earnings in the event of unemployment.  Lone parents in particular face many constraints, such as the need to 
maintain existing childcare arrangements, which may limit their ability to respond quickly to income shocks because of 
restricted mobility, both geographically and between jobs.  One implication of these constraints is that, for lone parents 
and their children, a continuity of child-support payments and employment-friendly government support is crucial 
across the economic cycle. 
 
Such household “coping strategies” are an important way of dealing with the challenges posed by income 
losses.  There is a strong case for designing government support in ways that harness and complement – 
rather than replace – households’ own capacities to adjust to adverse circumstances.  For instance, a new 
OECD study suggests that countries that invested heavily in active labour market policies already before 
the crisis were successful at limiting its adverse impact on employment levels.
7  At the same time, transfers 
and other forms of government support will always be needed.  In general, consumption smoothing is more 
difficult for low-income households who are therefore more dependent on government transfers for 
“pushing through” low-income spells, even if they are temporary.  An important policy objective is to 
avoid situations that force households to cut down on the consumption of necessities (such as food, shelter 
and essential health care) or compromise future prospects (for example, by disrupting education). 
                                                      
7 .  The results are reported in the 2011 edition of the OECD Employment Outlook. 
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one of the most crucial questions in social policy.  After a deep recession, the stakes are especially high.  
On the one hand, the social consequences of inadequate government support grow with the number of 
people facing economic hardship.  On the other hand, the payoffs of successfully promoting self-
sufficiency are also greater, as it alleviates fiscal pressures and facilitates economic recovery. 
The high fiscal cost of joblessness reinforces the case for well-funded active social policies, even if these 
are costly in the short term.  But fiscal constraints may require a rapid transition from broad, stimulus-type 
programmes to selective and customised employment support.  The short-term cost of creating an extra job 
through broad reductions in non-wage labour costs (such as employer social security contributions) can be 
very high – more than 150 percent of average earnings according to OECD calculations.  More targeted 
programmes (such as subsidies for new hires only) are much less costly in aggregate, but success rates can 
be low if they focus on disadvantaged groups which are more difficult to get back into work.  Job-search 
assistance is particularly effective for those with relatively recent labour-market experience.  For others, 
especially the young, training measures are an option. Some evaluations of on-the-job training show 
significant longer-term economic benefits, while classroom-type training frequently inhibits effective job-
search. 
In summary, the costs and performance of different types of active social policies vary substantially and 
some provide quicker results than others.  Channelling scarce resources towards the most efficient 
programmes is essential when budgets are tight.  In addition, individual programmes are unlikely to be 
equally well-suited in different phases of the economic cycle, and the best combination of policies will 
depend on labour market conditions as well.  A frequent evaluation of whether policies in their current 
form are still meeting their objectives is therefore important, especially while economic conditions remain 
volatile.  For instance, as the recovery gains momentum and promoting labour supply becomes more 
important, there is a case for shifting the focus of active labour-market policies from labour-demand 
support (wage subsidies etc.) towards in-work support for low-income working families.  Nevertheless, 
well-targeted wage subsidies for individual groups, such as youth, may be effective even as overall labour 
demand picks up during the recovery.  More generally, and as shown above, crisis-related labour-market 
problems differ substantially between groups and a review of policies in this area needs to account for 
these differences. 
3.3.  Female employment is a key contributor to household resilience 
Active policies are more successful at restoring self-sufficiency, if they account as much as possible for the 
family situation of jobless individuals.  To date, policy responses to the crisis have mostly concentrated on 
individual job losses and less on the situation of households and families (Part 4 discusses policy changes 
in detail).  To be as effective as possible, work-related support should not be restricted to individual job 
losers, but directed at non-working partners as well. 
More women now have current or recent labour-market experience than in previous recessions.  This has 
increased their chances of successfully compensating some of their partners’ earnings losses, either by 
finding a job, or by working more (this is often referred to as an “added-worker” effect). Households where 
both partners engage in active job search are better able to minimise income losses in the event of 
unemployment, and are also in a better position to benefit quickly from improving labour-market 
conditions. 
Whether or not partners of job losers are in fact likely to search for – and find – employment, depends on a 
number of factors.  For instance, it is not clear whether a recession would strengthen or weaken the 
“added-worker” effect.  On the one hand, accelerating job losses, less stable employment patterns during 
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the year and reduced working hours clearly create a greater need to compensate a drop in household 
income.  On the other, the weak labour market makes it harder to do so. 
New labour-market data show how important female employment is to reduce economic hardship 
(Figure 7).  Job loss and working-time reductions among partnered men have lowered overall working 
hours in couple families by between 5.5% in the United States and 0.7% in the Czech Republic (Panel A).  
Working-hours reductions were also sizable in some of the countries showing little change in 
unemployment (Austria, Germany).  With the exception of Switzerland, women’s working hours have 
increased, or have fallen less than for men in all of the countries shown.  Panel B of Figure 7 shows that 
partnered women were significantly more likely to work more than singles, which also points to an “added 
worker” effect. 
For women who are already employed full-time, working significantly more is not an option.  In many 
countries, a large number of women work part-time, however, leaving considerable scope for increasing 
total working hours even in countries where female employment rates are comparatively high, such as 
France or the Netherlands.  In a few countries (including Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand), 
additional hours worked by women were somewhat greater than reductions in male working hours.  But 
women are, on average, paid significantly less than their partners, so that households will nevertheless tend 
to suffer earnings losses overall, even if total hours worked are unchanged or even increased. 
The degree to which partnered women were able to compensate for their partners’ earnings losses varies 
between countries, and policy factors are likely to play a decisive role here.  The perceived need for 
women to find employment or seek longer hours may be limited if men’s earnings losses are seen as 
temporary (as a result of short-time working schemes, for example) or are largely compensated by 
government transfers.  In addition, disincentives created by taxes and out-of-work benefits can affect job 
search and/or work effort, not just for the principal earner in a household, but also for second earners.  
Means-tested unemployment benefits, which are reduced once a partner starts to earn more, can be a big 
obstacle for boosting female employment.
8  This is an important policy challenge, as those entitled to 
means-tested benefits have very low incomes and would therefore have a lot to gain from an “added-
worker” effect. 
Labour-market institutions that allow swift adjustments of work patterns combined with help to overcome 
family-related employment barriers (such as the need to find childcare) can support added-worker effects, 
while persistent gender-wage gaps limit women’s ability to help stabilise family incomes.  Policies that 
address gender-specific employment barriers tend to strengthen families’ resilience to economic shocks, 
and improve their prospects of benefiting from a recovery.  The current momentum in many countries 
towards a more equal sharing of market work in the household implies that the on-going recovery presents 
a distinct opportunity for making progress on the gender-equality agenda. 
                                                      
8 .  This is shown in a recent OECD report: Immervoll, H. and L. Richardson (2011), “Gender Wage Gaps, 
Work Incentives and Public Policies to Reduce Gender Inequality”. 
  15Figure 7.   In most countries, women’s employment greatly improves families’ resilience to economic shocks 
Total hours worked by men and women: Change since onset of crisis 
Notes: Changes in panel A are shown relative to family pre-crisis hours (i.e., the sum of men’s and women’s hours).  Changes in 
panel B are shown relative to individual pre-crisis hours in the respective groups.  Changes capture differences in both employment 
levels and average hours worked in a job.  They are measured as total hours in the four latest available quarters minus total hours in 
the four pre-crisis quarters in each country. 
Source: OECD calculations based on tabulations of national labour force data and European Labour Force Surveys. 
4. Policy  developments 
4.1.  Benefit expenditures after a downturn: how do current trends compare? 
Historically, cuts in benefit expenditures during fiscal consolidation phases have been slow compared with 
the rapid spending growth during recessions.  For instance, an OECD analysis of spending data shows that, 
in the past, a 10 percentage-point rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the previous year was associated with a 
0.4 percent cut in real benefit spending.  Annual spending increases in a recession were typically ten times 
as large.
9 
These links between social spending levels and key economic variables, such as unemployment and 
economic growth, provide a useful context for discussing current social expenditure trends.  Figure  8 
compares current expenditure changes (“observed” and “announced”, dark bars) with those that one would 
see if each country reacted in the same way to economic fundamentals as the average OECD country did 
during the past three decades (“expected”, light bars).
10  The left-hand panel shows expenditure increases 
in the early phase of the downturn, while the right-hand panel looks at spending changes that countries 
have announced for 2011 (the “announced” changes are Secretariat projections based on policies known or 
implemented by autumn 2010). 
                                                      
9 .  Expenditures on services and in-kind benefits are not considered in these results, but are generally much 
less cyclical than cash spending. See footnote 2. 
10 .  They therefore should not be interpreted as guidelines for what individual countries should be aiming for. 
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Among the OECD as a whole, total social transfer spending has responded in about the same way to 
economic developments as it did in the past.  Following the sharp drop in economic output in 2009, total 
benefit spending increased by about 7.5 percent in real terms (left-hand panel).  Given the projected 
persistence of unemployment into 2011, past experience would suggest a small real-term increase of social 
benefit spending compared to 2010, in spite of high deficits in most countries and very high debt levels in 
some (right-hand panel).  On average across countries, the announced spending plans for 2011 match this 
expected change. 
Different initial policy responses to the downturn explain why some countries have seen much larger or 
smaller spending increases during 2009.  Some have adopted sizable discretionary stimulus packages with 
a strong focus on supporting household consumption.  In Australia, for example, most measures in 2009 
were one-off or strictly temporary (as a result, spending fell strongly in the following year).  Norway saw a 
big year-on-year increase in incapacity benefit expenditures, which accounts for a large share of the overall 
spending increase of more than 12 percent in 2009.  In Iceland, unemployment benefit expenditure more 
than quintupled from 2008-2009.  Spending on the quantitatively much more important incapacity support 
rose only comparatively little, however, while spending on old-age pensions declined.  In a few other 
countries, the recent recession has resulted in much smaller expenditure increases than past spending 
patterns would suggest.  In Korea, spending on unemployment benefits grew strongly between 2008 and 
2009, but overall transfer spending rose by much less than expected.  This is because growth in 
expenditure on old-age and, especially, social assistance benefits slowed significantly relative to the pre-
crisis years when the coverage of these programmes was actively expanded.  In the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, spending growth before the crisis was also high, leading to an expectation of even higher growth 
for 2008-2009 based on past experience.  This did not materialise as both governments actively sought to 
hold spending down.   
Nine countries were planning to cut real spending on social transfers in 2011, most of them in the context 
of persistently high unemployment and weak growth.  Among this group, Iceland, Ireland, Greece and 
Portugal face substantial market and institutional pressures to restrain the growth of government debt.  
Their planned spending is therefore much lower than past trends would indicate.  Current deficits are also 
large in the United States, which recorded the second-highest growth in benefit spending in the OECD 
between 2007 and 2010, after Ireland.  When the 2011 spending projections were prepared, the United 
States also looked likely to cut spending by a substantial margin, as is shown in the graph.  However, 
extended unemployment benefits have since been renewed through 2011 (in addition, national data on 
benefit expenditures have been revised).  These developments will probably bring 2011 spending closer to 
the “expected” value indicated in Figure 8.  In Denmark, Hungary and Japan, policy developments indicate 
that spending growth in 2011 may be significantly higher than trends in economic fundamentals might 
suggest. 
  17Figure 8.  Social expenditure expansion and containment after the crisis 
Real spending per-capita on social transfers, year-on-year change, in per cent 
 
Notes: Expenditure levels refer to social benefits paid by government (SSPG series in the OECD Economic Outlook Database).  
“Announced” changes are based on Economic Outlook projections, which account for policy measures announced or implemented by 
autumn 2010.  “Expected” changes are based on an econometric model using country panel data of spending on social benefits 
spanning three decades prior to the recent economic crisis.  The model specifies (changes) in real-term per-capita spending as a 
function of a number of key economic variables (unemployment, government debt, female employment rates, government revenues, 
GDP growth, and a “recession” dummy), as well as a full set of time-period and country dummies that capture country-specific trends.  
“Expected” changes for 2010-2011 are then calculated by applying the estimated model to projected values of these variables taken 
from the Economic Outlook Database. 
Source: OECD (2010), Economic Outlook, No. 88.; D’Addio, A.C., H. Immervoll and A. Llena-Nozal (2011), “How Responsive Is 
Social Benefit Spending to Changing Economic Conditions?”, unpublished manuscript. 
4.2.  Earlier crisis-related measures 
Increasing expenditures on social protection in the aftermath of economic downturns are a natural 
consequence of their role as an insurance mechanism for families and an automatic stabiliser for the wider 
economy.  By increasing social protection budgets, OECD governments have allowed these automatic 
stabilisers to operate.  If social and labour-market policies succeed in preventing long-term benefit 
dependency and re-establishing self-sufficiency, this automaticity should work in the opposite direction as 
well: social expenditures should recede as families and the economy recover. 
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In addition to automatic spending increases, however, discretionary stimulus packages implemented from 
2008 onwards were often designed to sustain household consumption, both to protect families’ living 
standards and to bolster aggregate demand.  Relevant measures included tax cuts or more generous benefit 
payments.  Many packages also sought to support labour demand.  As crisis-response measures, these 
policies were frequently time-limited (e.g., one-off payments or simple top-ups of existing benefits).  As 
with automatic stabilisers, expenditure increases should be temporary in these cases.  Some discretionary 
measures were in fact discontinued earlier than originally planned (e.g., more generous unemployment-
benefit provisions in Portugal and lump-sum top-ups for benefit recipients in Greece).  Others, in the 
Czech Republic, for example, were not implemented at all, as governments faced greater-than-expected 
fiscal constraints.  Some temporary provisions were, however, extended – in some cases repeatedly (e.g., 
short-time working schemes in Germany, longer durations of unemployment benefit in the United States).   
Using recent information that countries have provided to the OECD Secretariat, Figure  9 summarises 
changes in tax/transfer policies since mid-2008, which were still in place by mid-2010.  It shows the 
proportion of countries that have made different provisions more or less generous over the two-year period.   
Unemployment benefit amounts remained more generous than in 2008 in only about one in ten OECD 
countries.  Less demanding eligibility conditions and longer benefit durations were kept in place more 
frequently (e.g., in Japan in order to facilitate access for non-standard workers), although a few countries 
have started to reduce durations to less than before the crisis (e.g., Denmark, Ireland).  Assistance benefits 
(social assistance or unemployment assistance) were higher in 2010 than in 2008 in over a third of 
countries, but changes in eligibility conditions or improved availability of cash housing benefits were rare 
(even in countries affected by major crises in the housing market).  Despite the importance of women’s 
employment for families’ income security, almost no OECD country has so far modified means tests to 
address the disincentives faced by second earners specifically.
11  Around one fourth of OECD countries 
have, however, sought to improve work incentives by extending in-work support (e.g., by providing 
additional support for childcare). 
Family-related benefits have generally been made more generous with more than half of countries 
providing additional help to families with children.  Such measures were, however, not more frequent in 
countries with high rates of child poverty.  Only a few countries have reduced benefits or tightened 
eligibility criteria for some family programmes (Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland).  But in addition to the 
already-implemented changes shown in the graph, several countries have announced future reductions for 
some or most families with dependent children (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg 
Portugal. United Kingdom). 
Old-age cash benefits account for 17 percent of all government expenditure in the average OECD country, 
and more than one fourth in some of them.  Because spending on old-age benefits reflects long-term 
financial commitments and entitlements, it tends to be much less cyclical than expenditures supporting 
working-age individuals and their families.  But if support for the elderly (or the tax treatment of pensions) 
contributes little to budget consolidation, this implies greater cuts for working-age individuals, which is the 
group who is already bearing the majority of crisis-related income losses.   
A range of measures mainly reflected longer-term concerns about the large and growing costs of paying 
public pensions (bottom left-hand panel of Figure 9).  Nearly one in three countries announced increases in 
pensionable ages, including the Czech Republic and Hungary to 65, Australia and Germany to 67 and the 
United Kingdom to 68.  Nearly one in five took other measures to reduce pension costs.  But in some of the 
countries with large consolidation needs (e.g., Ireland), support for retirees was not a significant 
                                                      
11 .  Austria has improved second-earner incentives: free health-insurance coverage for unemployed individuals 
now continues even if the main benefit payment stops as a result of the family means test. 
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contributing to short-term consolidation measures.  Short-term measures included changes in the 
indexation of pensions in payment (in Iceland, Portugal and several other countries).  Countries with high 
pension spending were more likely to take steps to reduce public pension expenditures.  At the same time, 
however, permanent improvements in old-age safety-net benefits were implemented or announced in more 
than a quarter of countries, including Australia, Greece, Korea and Spain all of which had above-average 
rates of old-age income-poverty before the crisis, on OECD standard measures.  Some, such as Iceland, 
have combined overall expenditure reductions with improved safety nets in order to protect the least well-
off. 
Changes to personal income taxes and social security contributions were at least as common as measures 
on the benefit side (bottom right-hand panel of Figure  9).  Around a third of countries increased 
contributions levied on employees and nearly a quarter on employers.  Cuts to employer contributions or 
payroll taxes, which aim to support labour demand, were, however, also common.  Around half of 
countries cut income taxes while a third took measures to increase them.  Tax changes – including tax 
concessions for high-income earners – were more likely in the 12 countries that experienced significant 
declines in total government revenues.  A few countries changed tax provisions that apply to pensioners, 
although no country appears to have raised tax burdens for pensioners specifically.  In Sweden, tax 
allowances for pensioners were instead made significantly more generous in order to offset some of the 
pension cuts resulting from an automatic balancing mechanism.  Finland has also provided additional tax 
concessions for pensioners. 
4.3.  The reform agenda: looking ahead 
The downturn has added urgency to a range of structural policy issues.  This presents an opportunity to 
renew the momentum of reforms that were already on the agenda prior to the economic crisis.  At the same 
time, there can be a risk that severe short-term policy constraints inhibit – or reverse – progress on reforms 
that are known to create significant future benefits.  For instance, fiscal pressures may lead to funding cuts 
for work/family reconciliation and other active social policies that are needed for boosting activity rates.  
Conversely, a continuing rise in long-term unemployment could prompt governments to ease access to 
early-retirement or disability programmes. 
In countries that have experienced mild to moderate downturns, important reforms were frequently going 
ahead as planned before the crisis.  These included measures towards improving the financial sustainability 
of public pensions (Australia, France, Norway, Sweden), new or strengthened work/family reconciliation 
programmes (e.g., a new paid parental-leave scheme in Australia and more generous subsidies for non-
parental childcare in Austria and Norway), as well as intensified activation measures (e.g., Netherlands, 
Sweden).  Better provision of childcare and extended access to parental leave were also implemented as 
planned in Portugal, despite budgetary pressures.  Planned pension reforms, such as increased statutory 
retirement ages, were generally also kept on track in countries with large or very large falls in GDP or 
employment (e.g., Japan, Slovenia).  Others accelerated pre-crisis plans towards increasing effective 
retirement ages (Finland, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Spain), strengthening targeted support of low-
income retirees (Chile, Greece) or introduced new initiatives to reduce future pension expenditures 
(Estonia and, to a lesser extent, Ireland). 
A common policy response to the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s was to reduce pensionable ages or 
make access to early-retirement or incapacity benefits easier.  Such policy changes result in greater inflows 
into “inactive” benefit programmes, and have led to an increase in inactivity rates which persisted for a 
very long time.  This time, governments resisted the pressures to repeat such policies, with only a couple 
making very minor adjustments.  For instance, Belgium has provided a small top-up payment for long-term 
recipients of incapacity benefits.  Korea has introduced a new disability pension, which is, however, 
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targeted to the severely disabled incapable of working.  In a few cases, certain measures to facilitate longer 
working lives were, however, put off after the crisis.  For instance, Austria delayed both the planned 
tightening of access to the part-time programme for older workers, and the phase-out of the unemployment 
transition “pre-retirement” benefit.  Even in the absence of policies that ease access to early retirement or 
incapacity support, lengthening unemployment spells tend to push up the numbers of people receiving 
“inactive” benefits.  In the aftermath of a recession, additional measures that prevent disability and early 
retirement from becoming substitutes for long-term unemployment are therefore particularly urgent.   
As one of the countries severely affected by the crisis, Estonia introduced far-reaching measures to reduce 
social expenditures in a context of rapidly falling employment rates.  Social policy reforms enacted before 
the crisis, including better income protection for the unemployed and a greater emphasis on active services, 
played an important role in mitigating its adverse consequences.  Benefits that redistribute horizontally 
(cash benefits for families with children) saw significant cuts, while some aspects of vertical redistribution 
were strengthened in order to ensure support for the least well-off (e.g., by increasing the budget for the 
Subsistence Benefit).  Concerns over the wider social implications of very large increases in 
unemployment have also led to the extension of health-insurance coverage to all registered unemployed 
(only benefit recipients were covered previously).  Sickness benefits were made less generous, while 
employer costs associated with layoffs were reduced in order to facilitate restructuring and support labour-
market dynamics for the recovery. 
One of the main policy challenges in the aftermath of the crisis was to ensure adequate and employment-
oriented support for a large number of poorly protected non-standard workers.  Many of the initiatives to 
maintain existing jobs (such as short-time working schemes) or strengthen protection for job losers 
(unemployment benefits, re-employment support) in fact mainly helped workers with a relatively 
favourable labour-market position, while providing little extra benefits for temporary workers or new 
labour-market entrants.  Several countries have strengthened safety-net benefits (Austria, France, Japan, 
Korea) or have improved access to unemployment insurance for non-standard workers (e.g., Slovenia), 
while Italy, where benefit coverage is low, has postponed the reform of financial protection for the 
unemployed.  In general, “dual” labour markets, with a core of well-protected workers and a growing 
number of unstable jobs at the margin, remain a fundamental issue in delivering and financing effective 
social protection.  The vulnerable position of non-standard workers became indeed much more visible in 
the aftermath of the crisis.  This was especially the case in Japan, Spain and some other countries where 
labour-market reforms prior to the crisis had primarily increased labour-market flexibility for non-standard 
workers, while largely retaining protective measures in place for permanent workers.  Spain has since 
announced a labour market reform which aims to address some of these issues.  The Japanese government 
is seeking to introduce measures that focus on protecting non-standard workers. 
  21Figure 9.  Changes to redistribution policies since the onset of the crisis 
 
Notes: Policy changes since mid-2008 that were still in place by mid-2010-.  Comparisons are made relative to pre-crisis policy 
parameters and not relative to pre-crisis plans (so crisis-related cancellations or delays of planned reforms are not counted).  The 
chart does not distinguish between measures that are strictly crisis-related and those that are not.  It therefore includes some policy 
measures that were planned or decided before the crisis. 
Changes in benefit amounts are only included if they exceed 5% of the 2008 value (beyond that, the chart does not show how much 
“more generous” or “less generous” provisions have become).  Countries are counted twice if some aspects became more and others 
less generous.   
Bars are for all countries, while “+” and “-“ markers show changes for specific country groups as follows:: 
High employment loss, based on expected changes in employment-to-population ratios between 2007 and 2011: Denmark, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, United States. 
High child poverty, with child poverty rates exceeding 15% in the mid-2000s: Canada, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United States. 
High pension spending, with pension expenditure exceeding 9% of GDP in 2007: Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia.  
Large revenue decline, based on changes in the real value of total government receipts between 2007 and 2009: Australia, Canada, 
Greece, Iceland, Israel, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. 
Sources: Country responses to OECD questionnaires.  Country groupings use information from the OECD Economic Outlook, Income 
Distribution and Social Expenditure databases. 
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5.  Policy priorities for supporting the recovery of households and government budgets 
Since the onset of the financial crisis, social policy debates have focussed on the adequacy and 
affordability of social protection measures designed to contain the downturn’s damaging effects on 
household well-being.  Most OECD countries have indeed taken significant steps to cushion income losses 
for some of the affected groups. 
But the challenges are sizable.  Public finances of major emerging economies are generally in better shape 
than in the OECD area, and in around a third of OECD countries, debt-to-GDP ratios were projected to 
remain below 60% in 2011.  But deteriorating public finances in most countries clearly limit the “room for 
manoeuvre”, as they seek to find a balance between fixing government and household budgets.  In some 
countries, the budgetary situation makes rapid and far-reaching consolidation measures unavoidable.  At 
the same time, recessions trigger large losses for some of the poorest income groups – a particular concern 
since the recent recession came on the heels of a medium-term trend toward greater inequality.  There is 
therefore a greater demand for income support.  Moreover, trends following previous recessions suggest 
that the sizable income losses of disadvantaged households can persist until well into the next economic 
upswing. 
This paper suggests four main policy priorities for addressing these challenges and supporting a recovery 
of households as well as government budgets. 
1. Balanced budget consolidation involving measures on the expenditure and the revenue side 
The fiscal or budget crisis is not just a spending crisis.  Recessions cause a slump in a range of important 
revenue sources and a possibility of extended periods of sluggish revenue growth. After the crisis, reduced 
government revenues have therefore often had a greater impact on the budget balance than inflated benefit 
expenditures.  In most OECD countries, a return to 2007 levels of transfer spending would have closed less 
than a third of the budget gap in 2010.  And, unsurprisingly, no OECD country has been able to achieve 
cuts of this scale in the context of weak growth and elevated unemployment.  Revenue-side measures 
therefore have an important role.  Importantly, historical income trends signal sizable shifts in the relative 
“tax capacity” from lower to higher-earning groups in the aftermath of steep downturns.  Governments 
should account for this when designing tax measures that seek to balance revenue needs with distributional 
concerns.  Like expenditure cuts, tax measures have to be carefully designed and targeted so as to avoid 
choking off a fragile economic recovery.  Moreover, revenue requirements are such that tax increases in 
any one area are unlikely to be sufficient for closing the revenue gap.  Governments will therefore need to 
consider a range of measures. 
2. Savings measures that address structural affordability problems, including in politically sensitive areas 
There are good reasons for prioritising some areas of social expenditure over others.  Yet all major 
spending items must be reviewed to yield short-term savings, including politically sensitive areas such as 
disability or early retirement benefits as well as old-age pensions. 
Previous recessions have shown that programmes leading to early withdrawal from the labour market 
(early retirement or quasi-retirement payments, disability benefits) create large and practically irreversible 
increases in social expenditure.  While often politically difficult, tightening the availability and generosity 
of these payments is an effective way of reducing social expenditures now and contributing to safeguarding 
future fiscal sustainability in the face of ageing populations and workforces. 
Old-age cash benefits account for 17 percent of all government expenditure in the average OECD country, 
and more than one fourth in some of them.  Because spending on old-age benefits reflects long-term 
financial commitments and entitlements, it tends to be much less cyclical than expenditures supporting 
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contributes little to budget consolidation, this implies greater cuts for working-age individuals, which is the 
group who is already bearing the majority of crisis-related income losses.  While reforms to retirement-
income systems quite rightly focus on long-term financial sustainability, short-term changes might help to 
spread the burden of fiscal adjustment more equally across income and age groups.  In principle, this 
approach would be best suited to countries where public pensions are relatively high (and so retirees were 
not significantly affected by the financial crisis), and where savings measures can be implemented in a way 
that does not risk increasing old-age poverty. 
3. Adequate protection for the most vulnerable 
Nine OECD countries were indeed planning to cut 2011 spending on social transfers in real terms, most of 
them in the context of persistently high unemployment and weak growth.  It is very difficult to cut social 
expenditures without increasing inequality, and historical data on income trends underline the importance 
of well-targeted government transfers during economic slumps, as well as during the recovery. 
On both the tax side and the benefit side, targeted measures can make fiscal consolidation more equitable.  
Replacing expensive and badly targeted indirect-tax concessions (for food, clothing etc.) with direct 
support for low-income households would yield sizeable fiscal gains and reduce inequality. Progressive tax 
measures, including tackling tax avoidance or evasion among higher-income groups, would also generate 
revenues while strengthening redistribution. Some forms of targeting, such as means-testing, can damage 
incentives and impose economic costs. But targeting on behaviour or non-income characteristics can 
produce cost savings, while leaving incentives intact (e.g., making conditioning benefits more tightly on 
claimants’ active job-search to prevent long-term benefit dependency). 
One priority area are measures that safeguard child well-being.  While contemporaneous poverty is of 
concern in itself, the adverse long-term consequences of child poverty are well documented.  These 
“scarring” effects of low-income spells mean that when the recession ends, its impacts on children do not.  
The provision of adequate, uninterrupted and active support for the least well-off is therefore a central and 
critical element of social protection, especially at a time of elevated poverty risks.  Public services can be 
an integral part of carefully balanced support for vulnerable groups, including children, as they can make 
access to important aspects of life less income-dependent.  As a result, service cuts can be a particular 
concern when a large number of people cannot afford market-based services. 
4. Investing in well-designed active social policies 
Redistribution strategies based on government transfers alone would be neither financially sustainable, nor 
effective at reversing the large income losses that vulnerable households have suffered as a result of the 
downturn.  Employment and earnings growth is essential both for reducing benefit spending, and for 
shoring up government revenues now and in the longer term.  In restoring incomes at the bottom, a key 
challenge for social and labour-market policy is to facilitate employment and earnings growth that benefits 
low-income groups in particular. 
For households affected by income losses, prospects for finding alternative earnings opportunities will 
improve as a recovery takes hold.  Clearly, for some households, this will be harder than for others, and 
consumption smoothing is more difficult for low-income households who are therefore more dependent on 
government transfers.  But evidence shows that a large number of new jobs are created even in the depths 
of a recession.  There is a strong case for designing government support in ways that harness and 
complement – rather than replace – households’ own capacities to adjust to adverse circumstances.  For 
instance, several countries that invested heavily in active labour market policies already before the crisis 
were successful at limiting its adverse impact on employment levels.  The high fiscal cost of joblessness 
  24   
  25
reinforces the case for well-funded active social policies, even if these are costly in the short term.  But 
fiscal constraints may require a rapid transition from broad, stimulus-type programmes to selective and 
customised employment support.  The best combination of policies will depend on labour market 
conditions as well.  For instance, as the recovery gains momentum and promoting labour supply becomes 
more important, the focus of active labour-market policies should shift from labour-demand support 
towards in-work support for low-income working families.   
To date, policy responses to the crisis have mostly concentrated on individual job losses and less on the 
situation of households and families.  To be as effective as possible, work-related support should not be 
restricted to individual job losers, but directed at non-working partners as well.  Households where both 
partners engage in active job search are better able to minimise income losses, and are also in a better 
position to benefit quickly from an improving labour market.  Indeed, women’s working hours have 
increased, or have fallen less than for men in most countries.  Policies should support the increased 
participation of women by addressing gender-specific employment barriers.  With the right policies in 
place, the current momentum towards a more equal sharing of market work in the household implies that 
an economic recovery presents a distinct opportunity for making progress on the gender-equality agenda. 